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Abstract. Programmers use security APIs to embed security into the 
applications they develop. Security vulnerabilities get introduced into 
those applications, due to the usability issues that exist in the secu- 
rity APIs. Improving usability of security APIs would contribute to im- 
prove the security of applications that programmers develop. However, 
currently there is no methodology to evaluate the usability of security 
APIs. In this study, we attempt to improve the Cognitive Dimensions 
framework based API usability evaluation methodology, to evaluate the 
usability of security APIs. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
In January 2014, hackers posted user-names and telephone numbers of 4.6 million 
US Snapchat account holders on-line due to an insecure Application Program- 
ming Interface (API) used in Snapchat app [12]. Snapchat is one of the most 
popular mobile apps among teens that allows its users to send and receive “self- 
destructing” pictures and videos. However, hackers claimed that their intention 
was to raise public awareness around the insecure API issue and also to put 
public pressure on Snapchat to get this security flow fixed. As reported in May 
2015, Starbucks suffered from a similar fate that hackers drained money from 
its customers’ bank and PayPal accounts through an insecure API [26]. Never- 
theless, programmers in the software development industry have been heavily 
dependent on the use of APIs [34] [33]. 
An API is a salient part of a reusable software component which acts as 
the interface where programmers can call the features of the component. Using 
features of a reusable software component through an API helps the programmer 
to use them effectively for developing applications, even without a knowledge of 
implementation details of the component. Therefore, the use of APIs has become 
an inseparable part of a programmer’s life. 
One of the functionalities that APIs provide is security. Due to high com- 
plexity of security concepts, security related components are designed and im- 
plemented by designers specialized in security [16] [33]. Programmers use those 
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components through APIs exposed, which we call as security APIs. Programmers 
use security APIs to achieve various security functionalities such as authentica- 
tion and authorization, input validation, encryption, decryption, hashing, etc. 
Even though APIs are important in software development process, often they 
are not very easy to learn and use in software development environment [3] [30] 
[31] [34]. Less usability of APIs causes to reduce efficiency of programmers where 
they have to spend significant time to learn the APIs [23]. Also less usable APIs 
lead programmers to incorrectly use them, which causes unintended behaviors 
in resulting systems. 
The situation is worse with less usable security APIs. When the programmer 
uses a security API incorrectly, that causes security vulnerabilities in the system 
s/he develops. In a study Fahl et al. carried out using 13500 popular free Android 
apps, they found that 8% of the apps are vulnerable to attacks like man in the 
middle attack, due to improperly using the Secure Socket Layer (SSL)/Transport 
Layer Security (TLS) APIs [13]. The authors have identified that the cause for 
this is not only the carelessness of the programmers, but also the usability issues 
of the SSL/TLS APIs used by programmers for developing those apps. 
If the usability of security APIs can be improved, they will be less prone 
to erroneous usages and therefore, will be less subject to introduce security 
vulnerabilities to the applications [16] [22]. As per the knowledge of the authors, 
currently there is no existing methodology to evaluate the usability of security 
APIs. Thus, in this study our contribution focuses on developing a methodology 
to evaluate the usability of security APIs. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related 
work from existing literature. Section 3 describes the new dimensions and ques- 
tionnaire we propose in this study. In the final section, we summarize the work 
presented and conclude with an outlook on future work. 
 
2 Related Work 
 
2.1 Usability of Security APIs 
 
APIs provide a mechanism for code reuse, where programmers can build their 
software applications on top of other software components which already exist 
rather than writing the code from scratch [20] [23] [27] [28] [33] [34]. Hence, 
effective APIs are important to ensure the better use of the underlying compo- 
nents, and the usability of APIs demands increasing interest [11] [34]. Due to 
the impact that API usability seems to have, Myers and Stylos [23] suggest that 
“Following its design, a new API should be evaluated to measure and improve 
its usability”. There has been a number of studies that introduce and use various 
methods to evaluate the usability of APIs [3] [8] [14] [19] [27] [28] [31]. Some of 
the most popular methods for evaluating usability of APIs are empirical evalua- 
tion [8] [9] [27], heuristic evaluation [19], conducting user studies [3] [29] [30] [31], 
API peer reviews method [14] and API concepts framework based automated 
methodology  [28]. 
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Even though, number of methods for evaluating API usability have been sug- 
gested as mentioned above, evaluating usability of security APIs is still a less 
attended topic [16] [22] [23]. Security APIs are a subset of APIs which are used 
to secure the boundary between trusted and untrusted code [1]. Bond [5] defined 
a security API as “an application programming interface that uses cryptography 
to enforce a security policy on the interaction between two entities”. However, 
this definition by Bond exclude some APIs which provide security functionali- 
ties without using cryptography (eg: input validation APIs such as Open Web 
Application Security Project(OWASP) esapi). Hence in this study, we consider 
security APIs as “application programming interfaces that provides developers 
with security functionalities that enforce one or more security policies on the 
interaction between atleast two entities”, as defined by Gorski and Iacono [16]. 
Several previous studies have discussed the importance of the usability of 
security APIs and the effects of the security APIs which are not usable [5] [13] [15] 
[22] [23] [32] [33]. Fahl et al. [13] and Georgiev et al. [15] list and discuss number of 
software, which were vulnerable to cyber attacks because of the usability issues in 
SSL/TLS API that has been used to develop the software. Myers and Stylos [23] 
also discussed the importance of the usability of security APIs, pointing to the 
results obtained by Fahl et al. [13]. Weber [32] describes the importance of the 
usability of APIs such as authentication API provided by Facebook. He suggests 
that APIs like those should be usable, otherwise cyber-security failures will result 
on the software which makes use of them. 
Wurster and Oorschot [33] highlight that most of the times programmers are 
not the experts of security, and also most programmers believe that their code is 
not security critical. Authors suggest that educating all the programmers about 
security concepts is not feasible and the most feasible solution is making the 
APIs that they use more secure and usable. 
Mindermann [22] discusses the importance of the usability of security APIs 
for developing more secure software. He claims that the security of developed 
applications will be far better if the security libraries are more usable. He also 
highlights the importance of applying usability research for security APIs to 
deliver more usable security APIs. 
Even though the importance of the usability of security APIs has been dis- 
cussed, only a limited work has been done to achieve this [16] [17]. By referring 
and analysing the outcomes of existing security studies, Gorski and Iacono [16] 
list 11 security API specific usability characteristics. According to the authors, 
this set is not complete, so there can be more characteristics that describe usabil- 
ity of security APIs. Green and Smith [17] also point out 10 rules to create a good 
crypto API. Furthermore, they urge the need for qualitative and quantitative 
empirical studies in this area. 
From looking at the existing literature, even though different methods have 
been identified to evaluate the usability of APIs, none of them has been used to 
evaluate the usability aspects of security APIs. In this study, we try to address 
this problem and propose a methodology to evaluate the usability of security 
APIs. 
4 
 
 
We are proposing an empirical evaluation methodology similar to the one 
used by Microsoft Visual Studio Usability group in their API usability evalua- 
tions [8] [9]. We choose this methodology over other usability evaluation tech- 
niques (i.e. heuristic evaluation, API peer review method, API concepts frame- 
work and conducting unstructured user studies) due to several reasons. First of 
all, empirical evaluation requires involvement of programmers who are the actual 
end users of the API. In our point of view, this is essential for evaluating the us- 
ability of security APIs, because security vulnerabilities caused by the usability 
issues that exist in security APIs, occur when programmers incorrectly use se- 
curity APIs. Getting them involve in the evaluation process will help evaluators 
to identify what usability issues presuade programmers to use the API incor- 
rectly. Furthermore, getting end users of the product involved in the usability 
evaluation process is considered as the gold standard among Human Computer 
Interaction (HCI) specialists [23] [24]. In addition to that, this methodology re- 
quires less expert intervening and also sensitive to wide range of usability aspects 
compared to API peer review method and API concepts framework. Therefore, 
we believe that conducting empirical evaluations using Cognitive Dimensions 
framework will be more effective than using other mentioned methodologies, for 
evaluating the usability of security APIs. 
 
 
2.2 Cognitive Dimensions Framework Based Usability Evaluation 
 
Cognitive Dimensions of Notation framework was first introduced by Green [18] 
as a broad-brush discussion tool to discuss usability issues of programming tools. 
In 1999, Kadoda et al. [21] used this framework to empirically evaluate usability 
of educational theorm provers. They changed the evaluation procedure by getting 
end user involved in the evaluation process through a questionnaire. Blackwell 
and Green [4] acknowledge the importance of this method saying that users do 
all the work here, so less expert involvement is required. However, this approach 
used by Kadoda et al. [21] have few drawbacks. Blackwell and Green [4] point 
out that, since system designer is the person who designs the questionnaire to 
evaluate the system and selects the dimensions to use, some usability aspects 
that may important in users perspective will be ignored. Furthermore, Blackwell 
and Green [4] mention that it adds extra burden since a different questionnaire 
has to be developed for each system to be evaluated. 
As a solution to these problems, Blackwell and Green [4] describe an en- 
hancement for this method which uses a generic questionnaire. They presented 
a complete questionnaire which covers all 16 cognitive dimensions of the Cogni- 
tive Dimensions Notation Framework of Green [18]. There are many advantages 
of using a generic questionnaire over using a questionnaire specific to a system. 
When using a generic questionnaire, user do all the work related to the usability 
evaluation and data retrieved through evaluation will only demonstrate user’s 
judgement. Furthermore, same questionnaire can be used to evaluate any sys- 
tem. Therefore, burden of creating questionnaire per each system has removed 
here. 
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In 2004, Clarke [8] presented a methodology used by Microsoft Visual Studio 
Usability Group to evaluate the usability of APIs. He used the same methodology 
described by Blackwell and Green [4] with a modified set of cognitive dimensions 
and a different questionnaire [10]. The framework Clarke used consisted of 12 
dimensions which are, 
• Abstraction level 
• Learning style 
• Working framework 
• Work-step unit 
• Progressive evaluation 
• Premature  commitment 
• Penetrability 
• API elaboration 
• API viscosity 
• Consistency 
• Role expressiveness 
• Domain correspondence 
Clarke alleges that Microsoft Visual Studio Usability Group has proved the 
relevance and the utility of the cognitive dimensions framework for evaluating 
API usability, however the usage of the above mentioned questionnaire has not 
been backed by any empirical evidence. Clarke mentions that he developed this 
questionnaire based on his experience and the feedbacks of participants who 
involved in usability tests at Microsoft [10]. Following is the methodology they 
used for evaluating usability of APIs. 
Firstly, experimenters recruit participants and ask them to write code that 
accomplishes various tasks using the API that need to be evaluated. While par- 
ticipants are doing this, evaluators recorded data such as video records of partici- 
pants’ behaviour and participants’ verbal accounts for their actions(Participants 
were employed in a think-aloud study [2] [6]). After the tasks are completed, 
the evaluators ask participants to answer the questionnaire [8]. Based on the 
participants’ feedback, evaluators identify the usability issues that exist in the 
API. 
Other researchers have also used this methodology for evaluating the usabil- 
ity of APIs. For an example, Piccioni et al. [27] used the same approach with 
slight modifications to evaluate the usability of a data persistence library API 
written in Eiffel. Without using the 12 dimension cognitive dimensions frame- 
work introduced by Clarke, they have only considered 4 dimensions which are 
understandability, abstraction, reusability and learnability. They have used their 
own questionnaire developed based on these dimensions. 
As discussed in the previous subsection, we propose the same methodology 
to evaluate the usability of security APIs. Even though we can use the same 
methodology described by Clarke [8] to evaluate usability of security APIs, the 
dimensions and questionnaire he used are not sufficient to do this. This is sup- 
ported by the fact that Gorski and Iacono [16], and Green and Smith [17] rec- 
ommend more different characteristics to consider when discussing usability of 
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security APIs. Also, improving usability with respect to some aspects can cause 
to reduce the security [23]. Thus, when evaluating usability of security APIs, 
we may have to omit some of the dimensions listed by Clarke and add some 
new dimensions. Therefore, in this study, we are proposing an enhanced and fine 
tuned version of Cognitive Dimensions framework and the questionnaire, that 
can be used to conduct empirical usability evaluations for security APIs. 
 
3 Questionnaire  Design 
 
We considered Microsoft’s version of Cognitive Dimensions framework [8] as the 
starting point to develop the new questionnaire. Then we improved it by refer- 
ring to the past studies conducted in this area [16] [17] and by taking usability 
guidelines those studies have mentioned into consideration. 
First, we took 10 rules mentioned by Green and Smith into account. Their 
first rule is Easy to learn - even without crypto background. This is re- 
lated to the Learning Style dimension in the Microsoft’s version of Cognitive 
Dimensions framework. Learning Style describes the knowledge about the API 
that the programmer needs to have before start using the API, and how user 
would gain the knowledge he requires about the API [7] [8]. However, Green and 
Smith talk about the cryptographic knowledge requirements that the program- 
mer needs to have. In previous sections, we discussed that most programmers 
who use security APIs are not security experts. Therefore, Easy to learn with- 
out crypto or security background is an important aspect to consider when 
evaluating usability. Since this is related to Learning Style dimension, with- 
out introducing as a new dimension, we added new questions to Learning Style 
dimension to cover this aspect. 
• Do you think your previous computer security related knowledge made it 
easy to use the API? What previous knowledge helped in using the API? 
• Do you think, if you had previous knowledge of any specific area related to 
computer security, it would have been easier to use the API? What are those 
areas you think would have been useful? 
We did not consider the Easy to use - even without documentation, 
Sufficiently powerful to satisfy non-security requirements, Hard to cir- 
cumvent errors - except during testing/development and Assist with/ 
handle end-user interaction rules. We could not get a proper idea about what 
the authors tried to convey from these properties by referring to the resources 
available. Also, since our objective is to improve the Cognitive Dimensions frame- 
work to support security APIs, we assume that not using these rules which are 
not related to security will not reduce the effectiveness of the framework. 
Hard to misuse is an important rule to consider when evaluating usability 
of security APIs, because most security related issues occur when programmers 
misuse security APIs intentionally and unintentionally. This aspect is not covered 
in the Clarke’s version of Cognitive Dimensions framework. Thus, we included 
this rule with the following questions. 
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• Have you come up with incidents where you incorrectly used the API and 
then identified the correct way of doing that? Did the API give any help 
to identify that you used the API incorrectly? If there were any similar 
incidents, please explain. 
• Did the API give proper error messages in case of exceptions and errors, or 
did you have to handle them at your programme level? If you had to handle 
them at your level, please mention the scenario/s. 
We decided to omit remaining rules, because Cognitive Dimensions frame- 
work already covered those rules by its existing dimensions. Easy to read and 
maintain code that uses it rule says the same as the Role Expressiveness 
dimension. Similarly Hard to override/change core functionality rule is 
covered by API Eloboration dimension and Appropriate to audience rule 
is covered by Learning Style dimension. 
Then we took 11 characteristics of the usability of security APIs suggested 
by Gorski and Iacono [16] into consideration. The first characteristic they have 
mentioned is End-user protection. This characteristic says that security of an 
application which uses a security API should not depend on the programmer who 
develops the application. It could be argued that this is something that needs 
to be considered when evaluating usability of a security API. Since this aspect 
is not covered in our questionnaire, we added a new dimension with questions 
to cover that. 
• Do you think the security of the end user of the application you developed, 
depends on how you completed the task? Or does it depend only on the 
security API you used? 
• If you think security of the end user depends on how you completed the task, 
in which ways does it depend? 
The next characteristic Gorski and Iacono have listed is Case distinction 
management, which refers to the handling of exceptional events and errors 
that occur related to the API. When these errors and events need to be handled 
by the programmer, most of the time they do it incorrectly, which leads to 
vulnerabilities in resulting applications [13] [15] [16]. This is the same issue which 
we discussed at Hard to misuse rule by Green and Smith [17]. Since we added 
new questions to Hard to misuse rule, we didn’t add new questions to Case 
distinction management rule again. 
We did not include the third characteristic mentioned by Gorski and Iacono, 
which is Adherence to security principals. It says that a security API must 
follow security guidelines such as “OWASP coding practises” [25]. This is not 
a property that can be evaluated by observing programmers who use API to 
implement their applications. So we did not add this characteristic in to the 
questionnaire. 
Fourth characteristic mentioned by Gorski and Iacono is Testability, which 
means API must support reliable test routines written by security experts. This 
closely relates to Learning Style and Progressive Evaluation dimensions 
of the Microsoft’s version of Cognitive Dimensions framework. However, those 
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dimensions do not address whether the API provide means to test the security 
of the application developed using the security API or not. Therefore, we added 
a new dimension Testability with following questions. 
 
• Did you test the security of your application after completing the task using 
security API? If not, can you explain why? 
• If yes, can you explain how did you do that? 
• Did the API provide any guidance on how to test the security of the appli- 
cation you developed? 
 
Next characteristic is Constrainability, which means letting programmers 
do configurations related to security causes security vulnerabilities. This is the 
same we discussed with API Elaboration and Hard to misuse, so we did not 
add new questions for Constrainability. 
Information obligation characteristic describes the extent which the API 
informs the programmer about the security relevant aspects of the security API. 
Even though the Penetrability dimension talks about the API related informa- 
tion exposed by the API to the programmer [7] [8], it does not address whether 
the API’s security related specifics are properly communicated to the program- 
mer. Therefore, without adding a new dimension, we added a new question to 
the Penetrability dimension to cover this characteristic. 
 
• Did the API (including its documentation) provide enough information about 
the security relevant specifics related to the task you completed? What in- 
formation was missing or you had to find by referring to external sources? 
 
Next characteristic by Gorski and Iacono, which is Degree of reliability, 
does not talk directly about a property of the API. It talks about the reliability 
of web resources that the programmer refers while using the API to achieve a 
task. However, the programmer refers to external unreliable resources (eg: stack- 
overflow), because API does not expose enough information to the programmer 
who is using it. We have considered whether the API is providing enough in- 
formation to the programmer or not, at Penetrability dimension. Therefore, 
we did not add a new dimension to the questionnaire to cover the Degree of 
reliability  characteristic. 
Security prerequisites characteristic says that there are mandatory pre- 
requisites that need to be fulfilled by programmers when using security APIs, 
which are often unknown and unclear. These prerequisites are also a type of secu- 
rity related information that an API needs to communicate to the programmer, 
which we described under Information obligation. Therefore, we did not add 
new questions to cover this characteristic, since this is already covered in our 
questionnaire. Similarly, we did not add new questions to Execution platform 
characteristic. It discusses the target execution platform that API is developed 
for and whether or not the information has been properly communicated to the 
programmer. We believe this characteristic is also covered by questions under 
Penetrability dimension. 
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Next characteristic, which is Delegation says that, the security APIs dele- 
gating implementation of security functionalities to the application programmer, 
can cause vulnerabilities in applications that the programmer develops. In End 
user protection, we discussed that security of the developed application should 
not depend on the application programmer, and we already included questions 
to cover this. Therefore, we did not included new questions into Delegation. 
The last characteristic, Implementation error susceptibility, says that 
security API usability research should aim to minimize the error susceptibility. 
According to the authors, error susceptibility is caused by ignoring the first 10 
characteristics that Gorski and Iacono mentioned. Hence, we assumed that this 
aspect is also covered by previous questions added. 
Based on our arguments in this section, we have formed a generic ques- 
tionnaire by improving Clarke’s cognitive dimensions questionnaire to conduct 
empirical evaluations for security API usability, which contains questions of 15 
dimensions(refer Appendix A for the complete questionnaire. 
 
 
4 Conclusion and Future Work 
 
In this work, we improved the version of Cognitive Dimensions framework in- 
troduced by Clarke [8] and introduced a generic questionnaire, to evaluate the 
usability of security APIs. We added new questions into Learning Style and 
Penetrability dimensions to cover the security related aspects. Furthermore, we 
introduced 3 new dimensions (i.e Hard to misuse, End-user protection and 
Testability) with questions which we argued referring to existing literature, to 
be important for evaluating the usability of security APIs. 
As a continuation of this work, we would be conducting empirical studies to 
prove the validity of the model and the questionnaire proposed. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A - Complete Questionnaire 
Abstraction Level 
• Do you find the API abstraction level appropriate to the tasks? 
• Did you need to adapt the API to meet your needs? 
• Do you feel that you had to understand the underlying implementation to be able 
to use the API? 
Learning style 
• Did you had to learn about different components exposed by API before starting 
to do anything useful related to your task? What are the components that you had 
to learn? 
• Did you had previous experience working with any of the components of the API? 
If you had, do you think, that knowledge was essential to do anything useful related 
to your task? 
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• Did you had to learn about dependencies between different components exposed 
by API before starting to do anything useful related to your task? What are the 
dependencies that you had to learn? 
• Did you had to learn about the underlying architecture of the API and other 
conceptual information before starting to do anything useful related to your task? 
• Does the API support learning (the stuff required to complete the task), while you 
progressing with the task? 
• Do you think your previous computer security related knowledge made it easy to 
use the API? Specifically what previous knowledge helped in using the API? 
• Do you think, if you had previous knowledge of any specific area, it would have 
been easier to use the API? What are they? 
Working Framework 
• What are the information you had to maintain while completing the tasks? 
• Which of them were represented in the API you had to use? 
• Which of them were not directly represented in API, but was represented in the 
way that your code is structured? 
• Which of them were not represented at all in the API or the code that you were 
writing? 
Work step unit 
• Does the amount of code required for this scenario seem just about right, too much, 
or too little? Why? 
• Doestheamountofcoderequiredforeachsubtaskinthisscenarioseemjustabout 
right, too much, or too little? Why? 
Progressive evaluation 
• How easy is it to stop in the middle of the scenario and check the progress of work 
so far? 
• Is it possible to find out how much progress has been made? If not, why not? 
Premature Commitment 
• When you are working with the API, can you work on your programming task in 
any order you like, or does the system force you to think ahead and make certain 
decisions first? 
• If so, what decisions do you need to make in advance? What sort of problems can 
this cause in your work 
Penetrability 
• What are the places where you had to distinguish between different methods and 
classes while you work on your programming task? 
• Were you able to find enough information to distinguish between different meth- 
ods and classes while you work on your programming task? If not, what are the 
information you think is missing? 
• What are the places where you had to understand the context or scope of the 
particular parts of the API you worked with? 
• Were you able to find enough information to understand the context or scope of 
the particular parts of the API you worked with? If not, what are the information 
you think is missing? 
13 
 
 
• What are the places where you had to understand the intricate working details of 
the API while you work on your programming task? 
• Were you able to find enough information to understand the intricate working 
details of the API while you work on your programming task? If not, what are the 
information you think is missing? 
• Did the API (including its documentation) provide enough information about the 
security relevant specifics related to the task you completed? What are the infor- 
mation that was missing or you had to find by referring to external sources? 
 
API Elaboration 
 
• Did you had to extend types exposed by the API by providing their own imple- 
mentation of custom behavior to accomplish task? What are the types you had to 
extend? Explain why you needed to extend the original type provided by the API 
in each case. 
• Did you had to replace existing types or introduce new types to accomplish task? 
What are the types you had to replace/introduce? Explain why you needed to 
replace existing types or introduce new types in each case. 
 
API Viscosity 
 
• When you need to make changes to previous work, how easy is it to make the 
change? Why? 
• Are there particular changes that are more difficult to make? Which ones? 
Consistency 
 
• Were there different parts of the API that mean similar things, is the similarity 
clear from the way they appear? Please give examples. 
• Are there places where some things ought to be similar, but the API makes them 
different? What are they? 
 
Role  Expressiveness 
 
• When reading code that uses the API, is it easy to tell what each section of code 
does? Why? 
• Are there some parts that are particularly difficult to interpret? Which ones? 
• When using the API, is it easy to know what classes and methods of the API to 
use when writing code? 
 
Domain  Correspondence 
 
• Did the types exposed by the API map directly onto the types and concepts you 
expected? If not, please mention the the types you expected and how it was sup- 
ported in the API? 
• Were there any types exposed by the API do not map directly onto the types and 
concepts you expected? What are they? 
 
Hard to Misuse 
 
• Have you came up with incidents where you incorrectly used the API and then 
identified the correct way of doing that? Did API give any help to identify that 
you used the API incorrectly? If there any similar incidents, please explain? 
14 
 
 
• Did the API give proper error messages in a case of exceptions and error, or did 
you had to handle them at your programme level? If you had to handle them at 
your level, please mention the scenarios. 
 
End-user Protection 
 
• Do you think the security of the end user of the application you developed, depends 
on how you completed the task? Or does it depend only on the security API you 
used? 
• If you think security of the end user depends on how you completed the task, in 
which ways does it depend? 
 
Testability 
 
• Did you tested the security of your application after completing the task using 
security API? If not, why? 
• If yes, how did you do that? 
• Did the API provided any guidance on how to test your application? 
